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1 Introduction
Policymakers perception of currency board arrangements (CBAs) have changed
since the advent of the global financial turmoil that began in East Asia in
1997. Although CBAs imply a loss of monetary and exchange rate inde-
pendence, they allow for greater financial integration and exchange rate sta-
bility. As a result, currency boards are increasingly promoted as a means
of enforcing financial discipline and of stabilising economies in the wake of
financial instability. Examples of well-established CBAs include Djibouti
(1949), Brunei Darussalam (1967) and Hong Kong (1983). The adoption of
CBAs in Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria during the early 1990’s
together with more recent proposals to extend these to Russia and Indonesia
has further contributed to a renewed interest in this particular form of a fixed
exchange rate regime.
The study of CBAs is, however, largely neglected in mainstream eco-
nomics even though they have been adopted in a variety of institutional
forms since their creation in Mauritius in 1849. The reasons for this over-
sight are twofold: first, the economies that implemented CBAs tend to be
small and generally lacking in global influence; second, the lack of systematic
and detailed data hinders serious empirical research on CBAs. The present
research hopes to improve upon this state of affairs by studying the CBA of
the Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Macau.
Macau’s prevailing CBA has not been the subject of systematic research
even though its sound economic performance has been widely acknowledged
in international financial markets. For example, Moody’s Investor Service
upgraded Macau’s credit rating twice in 2003, once in February from Baa1
to A3, and again in October from A3 to A1. In addition, Macau’s CBA
is characterised by a double-peg arrangement of its currency, the Pataca
(MOP), that is unique in the annals of international exchange rate arrange-
ments (Scott, 1997). Although the Pataca’s formal link is to the Hong Kong
dollar (HKD), it has a de facto link to the U.S. dollar (USD), as the HKD is
itself pegged to the USD.
The main objective of our study is to assess the credibility of Macau’s rule-
based CBA, which can be inferred by studying the relationship between ex-
change market pressure (EMP) and the three anchors used to fix the exchange
rate, namely interest rate arbitrage, exchange rate arbitrage and economic
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discipline. A pure CBA allows the first two anchors to function automati-
cally and by pursues sound fiscal policies. As a result, the CBA’s credibility
is reflected in the narrowing of interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the anchor
currency, exchange rate and/or foreign reserves stability and either zero or
low government debt.
Following the approach adopted in Braga de Macedo, Nunes and Brites
Pereira (2003), we study the stochastic properties of EMP by employing a
Markov regime-switching framework with an Exponential Generalized Au-
toregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (MSGARCH) model. Specifi-
cally, we assess how the dependent variable of EMP responds to lagged
changes in explanatory variables that capture the effect of the CBA’s three
anchors. The regime-switching framework is chosen as it is best suited to
capture the stylised features of EMP dynamics, such as volatility clustering,
asymmetric response of volatility to different types of shocks, non-normality,
time-varying transition probabilities and possible differences in the distribu-
tions across regimes.
Our results suggest that Macau’s CBA is stable and has been charac-
terised by a state of low volatility since late 1992, with the brief exception
of the East Asian financial crisis period (1997-98). The paper’s main finding
is that fiscal fundamentals have a more pronounced role in reducing EMP
variability during “normal” times when volatility is low whilst interest rate
arbitrage is more important in crisis periods when volatility is high. We also
find evidence in favour of the exchange rate arbitrage mechanism during pe-
riods of low-volatility but it appears that this mechanism is not as important
as either interest rate arbitrage or fiscal discipline. Overall, we conclude that
Macau’s CBA is credible at present. In practice, this credibility is reflected
in the low frequency of observed EMP, in the narrowing of Macau’s inter-
est rate differential vis-à-vis U.S. interest rates and in its substantial fiscal
reserves.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the
operation of CBAs and briefly reviews Macau’s historical CBA experience.
Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology employed and the estimation
results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Currency Board Arrangements
2.1 Theoretical Overview
A CBA is a monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment
to exchanging domestic currency for a specified foreign currency (reserve
currency) at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the issuing
authority the currency board, to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation
(Baliño and Enoch, 1997).1 A typical currency board can therefore only issue
notes and coins when these are fully backed by foreign exchange reserves at
a fixed exchange rate against a designated foreign currency. In other words,
a CBA represents an unequivocal commitment to supply or redeem, without
limit, the monetary liabilities issued by the currency board at that fixed rate.
The exchange rate can be fixed in one of two ways: either by using foreign
exchange controls and/or government interventions in the market, or second,
by directly harnessing self-interested market forces. The latter approach
underlies the classical CBA theory, as it relies on three specific anchors to
bind the exchange rate, namely, interest rate arbitrage (specie flow), exchange
rate arbitrage economic and discipline, which mutually reinforce one another.
In theory, the fact that new cash issues are only possible with a balance
of payments surplus ensures economic discipline in monetary and fiscal pol-
icy. As such, it is not possible for the currency board to extend credit to
the government or to the banking system, which implies a loss of monetary
sovereignty. The consequence for fiscal policy is also clear: the absence of
printing press finance implies the acceptance of a hard budget constraint
and, by extension, public debt levels must be kept within limits of service-
ability. Sound fiscal policies improve the credibility of the chosen peg because
the political cost of policy failure is higher with an explicit commitment to
maintain the CBA. In sum, the strong commitment to the external currency
stability limits the scope of discretionary policies and reduces the probability
of irresponsible behaviour by political decision makers. Economic discipline
is thus able to generate confidence and contributes to exchange rate stability.
The anchor of economic discipline alone is insufficient to fix the exchange
rate, however. Two automatic stabilizers, namely interest rate and exchange
1For a discussion regarding the operation of some existing CBAs refer to Bennett
(1993), Baliño and Enoch (1997), Tsang (1999), Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2000),
Pao (2003) and Gerlach (2003).
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rate arbitrage, are needed to provide additional anchorage. The interest rate
arbitrage mechanism works as follows: an outflow of capital, possibly due
to doubts about the exchange rate and the economy’s weakness, causes the
money supply to contract and domestic interest rates to rise. In turn, the
higher interest rates induce an immediate counter-flow of funds that automat-
ically stabilises the exchange rate without government intervention (Hanke,
Jonung and Schuler, 1993). This adjustment is possible because interest rates
are purely market-determined in a CBA, given the link to interest rates in
the country to whose currency the domestic currency is anchored. The ad-
justment process is further predicated on the absence of exchange rate risk
or persistent economic uncertainty. Should the exchange rate be seen to be
unstable, a substantial interest rate premium might be needed in order to
induce the desired capital counter-flow. In turn, the higher interest rates
might be regarded as a sign of weakness, which leads to a vicious circle. Un-
der these circumstances, the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage alone is
incapable of fixing the exchange rate.
Hence, the need for a second adjustment mechanism that directly binds
the exchange rate in a CBA, namely exchange rate arbitrage (alternatively
known as currency or cash arbitrage). Cash arbitrage can be carried out
because the currency board has sufficient foreign reserves to cover all of
the cash in circulation. Should the market exchange rate weaken below the
official rate, agents can first convert their bank deposits into cash in order
to exchange it into foreign currency at the stronger official rate, and then
sell the foreign currency thereby obtaining an arbitrage profit. Exchange
rate arbitrage appeals to the self-interest of market participants when the
market exchange rate deviates form the official parity, not unlike the arbitrage
process under the gold standard where people shipped gold bullion between
countries (Officer, 1993). As a result, the selling pressure on the foreign
currency will bring the market exchange rate back to the level of its official
counterpart .
In practice, existing CBAs have different institutional, policy and macroe-
conomic drawbacks that prevent the unhindered operation of the automatic
stabilisers. For example, monetary authorities often opt for proactive mea-
sures in their defence of the established exchange rate, such as discretionary
foreign exchange market intervention and/or resort to interest rate changes.
In doing so, the degree of “automaticity” of the CBA adjustment process is
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reduced thereby compromising the assured benefits of the CBA’s hard peg.
In contrast, a pure CBA will signal its credibility by allowing the interest
rate and exchange rate arbitrage mechanisms to function effectively and by
pursuing sound fiscal policies. As a result, the CBA’s credibility is reflected
in the narrowing of interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the anchor currency,
exchange rate and/or foreign reserves stability and either zero or low gov-
ernment debt. In sum, a credible CBA must be perceived as representing a
durable and credible commitment to sound monetary and fiscal policies in
order to deliver financial stability.
2.2 Macau’s CBA Experience
Under the prevailing CBA, the Pataca is directly linked to the HKD, which
is the anchor currency, and any Pataca issues must be fully backed by foreign
exchange reserves.2 The current arrangement can be traced back to the year
1905 when the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) was granted the exclusive
right to issue Pataca-denominated banknotes by Macau’s government. The
Pataca circulated for the first time on January 27, 1906 and has been Macau’s
legal tender ever since. However, in 1980, the Government transferred the
exclusive right to issue Patacas from the BNU, which has traditionally acted
as the government’s banker, to the Issuing Institute of Macau (IEM), which
regulated Macau’s financial sector.3 Although, the BNU still continues to
issue Pataca banknotes it does so as an agent bank of the IEM. In addition,
the Macau Branch of the Bank of China (BOC) became the second note-
issuing bank on October 16, 1995, following the government’s renewal of its
note issuance agreement with the BNU.
With the establishment of the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority
of Macau (AMCM) on July 1, 1989, the authority to issue Patacas was trans-
ferred to then Portuguese-administered government. The Macau government
still retains this function after the territory became a Chinese Special Ad-
ministrative Region on December 20, 1999.4 The existing CBA requires that
2Macau’s currency derives its name from a silver coin that used to circulate widely in
Asia, the Mexican Eight Reales, which the Portuguese knew as the Pataca Mexicana.
3The Portuguese name for the IEM is Instituto Emissor de Macau.
4With the establishment of the Macau SAR, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Au-
thority of Macau simplified its name to the Monetary Authority of Macao and, in line
with common practices, retained the acronym AMCM.
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the BNU or the BOC obtain non-interest bearing certificates of indebted-
ness (CI’s) from the AMCM as legal backing for banknote issues. For this
purpose, the two banks must deposit an equivalent amount of foreign ex-
change or interest earning assets, denominated in USDs or HKDs, with the
AMCM. These foreign exchange deposits are counted as part of the official
foreign AMCM-held exchange reserves and assure the full convertibility of the
Macau Pataca with respect to its anchor currency at a fixed rate of MOP
1.03/HKD.5
The Pataca was originally pegged to the Portuguese Escudo (PTE) at a
exchange rate of PTE 5.015/MOP. However, this historic relationship was
abandoned on 9 April 1977 due to the Escudo’s sharp devaluation, which
occurred in the wake of Portugal’s post-revolution economic turmoil. The
Pataca was linked instead with the then floating HKD at a rate of MOP
1.075/HKD. In 1983, the Sino-British dispute over the future of Hong Kong
sparked a confidence crisis in the territory that threatened to deteriorate
into a full-blown economic crisis. In order to prevent this from happening,
Hong Kong’s government decided to readopt the currency board system on
17 October 1983, effectively linking the HKD to the USD at a rate of HKD
7.80/USD. As a result, the Pataca became indirectly pegged to the United
States dollar at an exchange rate of about MOP 8.03/USD.
Macau’s monetary policy is set within the broad framework stipulated by
its Basic Law, which establishes long-termmonetary stability as the AMCM’s
fundamental objective. Moreover, the AMCM’s ability to defend the value
of the Pataca is extremely high given the high level of international reserves
in relation to imports and the virtual absence of sovereign external debt. In
relation to fiscal policy, the fact that the Macau operates a currency board
has served as a major incentive to follow a sound and prudent policies. As
a result, Macau’s government is debt free and has substantial fiscal reserves
from accumulated budget surpluses in past years.
Macau’s sound economic performance is acknowledged in financial mar-
kets, as evidenced by the recent upgrade in its international credit rating.
After carefully assessing Macau’s economic, social and political situation,
Moody’s Investor Service upgraded Macau’s overall credit rating twice in
5At the end of 2002, the foreign exchange reserves of the AMCM totalled 481% of the
M1 and 31% of the M2 monetary aggregate.
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2003: once in February 2003, from Baa1 to A3, and again in October 2003,
from A3 to A1. Nevertheless, the credibility of Macau CBA’s has not been
researched until now. In the next section we assess the credibility of the
prevailing CBA by studying the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on the
stochastic properties of EMP.
3 Empirical Analysis
The seminal contribution in the definition and measurement of EMP is that of
Girton and Roper (hereafter, G-R)(1977), which uses the monetary approach
to the balance of payments to measure the excess demand for a currency.6 In
their study, EMP is defined as the magnitude of money market disequilibrium
that must be removed either through reserve or exchange rate changes. As
such, G-R propose a summary statistic that is calculated as the sum of the
change in foreign reserves (deflated by the level of the monetary base) and
the change in the exchange rate, as a proxy measure of actual EMP. The
rationale underlying their methodological approach is that exchange rate
changes necessarily reflect a central bank’s passive adjustment to EMP while
purchases or sales of foreign assets are its active response.
Recall, however, that the Pataca is indirectly pegged to the USD, via the
HKD. As a result, exchange rate changes cannot be used as an instrument by
monetary authorities in Macau to affect EMP, which can only be removed by
changes in foreign reserves. The first step in the assessing the credibility of
Macau’s CBA is, therefore, to determine whether or not changes in Macau’s
foreign reserves are a suitable measure of EMP. This assessment is undertaken
next by applying the G-R model to foreign reserves data. In empirical terms,
the G-R model is estimated using the following equation:
rt + et = δ1p∗t + δ2yt + δ3mt + δ4dt + εt (1)
where the dependent variable is the G-R summary statistic and εt denotes
the error term. The variables are defined as follows: rt is the change in foreign
reserves (denominated in Patacas), et is the exchange rate change, p∗t is the
growth rate of foreign prices, yt is the change in domestic income, mt is the
change in the money multiplier and dt the change in domestic credit. The
6For a brief literature review of EMP refer to Weymark (1998) and Spolander (1999).
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formal derivation of the model is presented in Appendix 1. Note that in the
case of a fixed exchange regime exchange rate changes are zero by definition
(et = 0) implying that the dependent variable in equation (1) is simply given
by rt.
The model’s intuition is that, for given growth rates of foreign prices and
domestic income, there will either be a proportionate loss in reserves with no
change in the exchange rate, or a proportionate depreciation of the domes-
tic currency with no change in reserves, or some combination of these two
events whenever domestic credit increases and vice versa. Upon estimation,
we find that G-R’s model is fits the data quite well (refer to Appendix 1)
which implies that EMP takes the form of reserve changes in the case of
Macau’s CBA.7 Having established this result, we address next the issue of
CBA credibility by studying the stochastic properties of EMP. Specifically,
we assess how EMP responds to changes in the explanatory variables that
capture the effect of the CBA’s three anchors, as discussed below.
3.1 MSGARCH Model
Following Gray (1996) and Braga de Macedo et al. (2003), our modelling
approach combines a Markov regime-switching framework with an Exponen-
tial Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (MSGARCH)
model. We adopt a regime-switching methodology as it particularly well
suited to deal with the dynamics of EMP, such as volatility clustering, asym-
metric response to negative shocks, non-normality, time-varying transition
probabilities and possible differences in the distributions across volatility
states. The dependent variable of our two-regime MSGARCHmodel is EMP,
defined as ∆st = 100 · ln[Rt/Rt−1] where Rt is the Pataca-denominated stock
of foreign exchange reserves at time t.8
Turning to the explanatory variables, the CBA’s anchors of interest rate
arbitrage, exchange rate arbitrage and fiscal discipline are respectively cap-
7Note, however, that G-R’s model relies on some rather restrictive assumptions, such
as purchasing power parity holding continuously, for example. This result should therefore
always be interpreted within the context of the monetary model used to derive the G-R
summary statistic.
8The measurement of reserve changes used here differs slightly from the one used in the
estimation of the G-R model. In Appendix 1, we show how it is related the latter measure
and also establish its validity as a EMP measure in the context of G-R (1977).
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tured using the following proxies: the change in Macau’s interest rate differ-
ential vis-à-vis U.S. interest rates (i∗), denoted by It = (it−it−1)−(i∗t−i∗t−1); 9
the percentage deviation of the MOP/USD exchange rate (St) from its im-
plied USD peg-value, defined as Dt−1 = 100.[St−1/Pegt−1 − 1]; 10 and, the
change in Macau’s current budget balance (BBt), which is measured as gov-
ernment’s revenue less its expenditure and denoted by Bt = 100 ·
³
∆BBt
|∆BBt|max
´
where |∆BBt|max is the largest observed budget balance change expressed in
absolute value terms.
TheMSGARCHmodel allows for the possibility that the effects of anchors
might differ across volatility states. The explanatory variables are therefore
allowed to affect the mean, the conditional variance, and the time-varying
state transition probabilities (TVTP) in each policy regime as follows:
∆sit = αi0 + αi1∆st−1 + αi2∆st−2 + αiIIt−1 + αiDDt−1 + αiBBt−1 + et
ln vit = βi0 + βi|e|
¯¯¯¯
et−1√
vt−1
¯¯¯¯
+ βie
et−1√
vt−1
+ βiv ln vt−1 + βiIIt−1 + βiDDt−1 + βiBBt−1
Pr(Zt = i|Zt−1 = i,Ψt−1) = Φ(γi0 + γi|I||It−1|+ γi|D||Dt−1|+ γi|B||Bt−1|)
et =
√
vitεt εit ∼ i.i.d t(di)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and t(di)
denotes a standardised Student-t distribution with di degrees of freedom, a
mean of zero and a unit variance. All explanatory variables are lagged one
period in order to avoid the problem of contemporaneous simultaneity with
the dependent variable.
The model’s parameters will depend directly on each of the two possible
values taken by the unobserved regime variable Zt, denoted by the subscript
i = 1, 2. We assume that Zt evolves according to a first-order Markov chain
9Upon estimation, however, we found that models estimated using the change in
Macau’s interest rate performed better on the basis of the AIC and SBC criteria. In
addition, these models had no residual heteroscedasticity, as was the case with those that
used the change in Macau’s interest rate differential. As a result, subsequent estimations
used It = (it − it−1) as the proxy for interest rate arbitrage.
10Note that there is no MOP/USD market exchange rate as the AMCM simply sets this
rate based on the 1.03 fixed rate via-à-vis the HKD and the HKD/USD market rate. The
manner in which the MOP/USD exchange rate is set implies that exchange rate arbitrage
opportunities automatically arise for the Pataca whenever the same happens to the HKD.
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where Pr(Zt = i| Zt−1 = j,Ψt−1) is probability that the process is in regime
i at time t, conditional on it having being in regime j during t − 1, with
Ψt−1 = {Zt−1,Zt−2,...,∆st−1,∆st−2, ...} denoting the information set of period
t− 1. Although the regimes are not directly unobservable, it is nevertheless
possible to infer the probability that the process is in regime i at time t by
calculating pit = Pr(Zt = i|Ψt−1). Let t(µ, v, d) denote a generic Student
t-distribution with mean µ, variance ν and d degrees of freedom and whose
density function is given by
f(z) =
Γ
¡
d+1
2
¢
Γ
¡
d
2
¢√
π
√
d− 2
√
ν
µ
1 +
(z − µ)2
(d− 2)ν
¶d+1
2
Under the assumptions made above, the dependent variable follows a mix-
ture of two distributions each weighted with probability pit for i = 1, 2, i.e.
∆sit|Ψt−1 ∼ t(µit, vit, di) with µit ≡ E[∆sit|Ψt−1] and where vit is as defined
above. The error term and the conditional volatility for period t−1 are then
calculated as
et−1 = ∆st−1 − E(∆st−1|Ψt−2) = ∆st−1 −
2P
i=1
pit−1µit−1
vt−1 =
2P
i=1
pit−1(µ
2
it−1 + vit−1)−
µ
2P
i=1
pit−1µit−1
¶2
In the mean equation, an effective interest rate arbitrage mechanism im-
plies that α
iI
> 0. For example, suppose that doubts about the economy’s
weakness lead to an outflow of capital. This causes the money supply to
contract and domestic interest rates to rise relative to foreign interest rates
(It−1 > 0), thereby inducing an immediate counter-flow of funds so that
reserves increase (∆st > 0). In the case of exchange rate arbitrage, if
the AMCM-determined exchange rate weakens below (strengthens above)
its implied MOP/USD peg-value, the ensuing selling (purchasing) pressure
on foreign currency will ensure that the stock of foreign reserves decreases
(increases), hence αiD < 0 whenever Dt−1 > 0. Finally, one expects that
an increase (decrease) in public savings (Bt−1 > 0) be associated with an
increase (decrease) in reserves (∆st > 0), ceteris paribus, which implies that
αiB > 0.
Turning to the conditional variance equation, the interest rate and ex-
change rate arbitrage mechanisms together with fiscal discipline are effective
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in reducing reserve volatility whenever βiI < 0, βiD < 0 and βiB < 0 re-
spectively. In other words, a credible CBA should be extremely successful in
responding to shocks by letting its automatic adjustment mechanisms work
and by following sound fiscal policies. The effect of volatility clustering in
the conditional variance equation is captured by the parameters β|e| and βv.
The latter parameter also captures the effect of persistence with βv < 1 im-
plying that the conditional variance is stationary. The asymmetric response
to shock is captured by the term βe. Negative shocks increase conditional
volatility more than would be the case with positive shocks whenever βe < 0.
Finally, the parameters γi|I|, γi|D| and γi|B| respectively capture the effect of
the three explanatory variables on the TVTP equations. While the signs of
these parameters are not easily predictable a priori on theoretical grounds,
the effect of the respective variable on the transition probability is easily
understood upon estimation. For example, γi|I| > 0 implies that (absolute)
changes in interest rates increase the probability of the process remaining in
regime i at time t.
3.2 MSGARCH Estimation Results
The analysis is undertaken using monthly data for the period January 1990
until July 2003 but the effective sample only begins in April 1990. Hamilton’s
filter is used to construct the log-likelihood and the filtered probabilities for
the whole sample. In order to better understand the effect of fiscal policy
on EMP, we estimate two MSGARCH models: the first comprises all three
anchors and is as specified above; the second, relies only on the interest rate
and exchange rate arbitrage mechanisms and so excludes the term Bt−1 from
all three equations. This approach allows us to infer the effect of the fiscal
discipline variable by way of comparison with the model where this variable
is not present. The two models are hereafter referred to as the full and the
reduced model respectively.
The results of the full and reduced models are presented in Tables 1 and
2 respectively. Note that the AIC and SBC criteria select the full model
as being the better model. Note that non-significant variables are excluded
from an estimated equation whenever appropriate. Moreover, whenever a
parameter did not significantly differ across regimes it was restricted to be the
same. The estimated parameters of those explanatory variables that were not
excluded from the models are all correctly signed and significantly different
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from zero at the 5% significance level in both cases. We label regime one
as the low-volatility state and the high-volatility state as regime two. Both
regimes have a first-order autoregressive element in the mean equation and
we find no evidence of asymmetric responses to shocks. The t-distribution
estimated degrees of freedom, which are rather low due to the likely presence
of thick tails, do not differ much between regimes in both models. Not
surprisingly, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution is also rejected.
Turning first to the reducedmodel’s results, we find that the exchange rate
arbitrage mechanism affects the mean in the low-volatility state as the pa-
rameter α
1D
(-0.7202) is correctly signed and significant at the 5% level. The
fact that our analysis has detected this effect at all is particularly notewor-
thy, especially when one considers that the AMCM-determined MOP/USD
exchange rate has deviated from its implicit peg-value by an average of less
than one percent during the time period considered. It appears, however,
that exchange rate arbitrage is clearly not as important as either interest
rate arbitrage or fiscal discipline judging by magnitudes of the respective
estimated parameter values.
We find evidence of the interest rate arbitrage effect being present in the
mean equation across both regimes. However, this effect is much stronger
in the high-volatility state as the estimated value of α
2I
(1.1512) is approx-
imately twice as large as that of α
1I
(0.6926). Interest rate arbitrage is also
effective in reducing volatility across both regimes but this time its effect
it is more pronounced in the low-volatility state. We also find evidence of
volatility clustering as the parameters β1|e| and β2|e| are significant, albeit
at different significance levels. Unexpectedly, these parameters are signed
differently across regimes. The estimates of β1v and β2v suggest moderate
persistence in the high-volatility state and none in the other. Finally, there is
no evidence of an indirect effect on volatility levels, via the TVTP, of either
of these mechanisms. This last observation suggests that factors external
to Macau might also important in accounting for regime change, especially
those attributable to economic, social and political events in Hong Kong.
The results that emerge from the full model allow us to refine the in-
sights obtained from the analysis of the reduced model. The inclusion of the
fiscal discipline proxy seemingly obviates the need to include variables that
capture volatility clustering and persistence effects. As before, none of the
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explanatory variables has an indirect effect on volatility and we find almost
identical evidence for the effect of exchange rate arbitrage mechanism, which
still only affects the mean of the low-volatility state (α
1D
=-0.7079). The ma-
jor difference, however, lies in the manner in which the interest rate arbitrage
mechanism now operates.
Although it has almost the same impact on the mean in both regimes as
before, our analysis reveals that it affects the conditional variance differently
across regimes. In particular, whilst interest rate arbitrage still reduces con-
ditional variability in the high-volatility state (β
2I
=-0.438), it is completely
ineffective in doing so in the low-volatility state. Instead, our results indicate
that fiscal discipline is solely responsible for reducing variability in this state
(β
1B
=-2.6763). Fiscal discipline also has a very strong impact on the mean
in the low-volatility state. Indeed, it seems that fiscal discipline is far more
important than the interest rate arbitrage mechanism in explaining changes
in mean EMP upon comparison of the estimated values of α
1B
(2.0769) and
α
1I
(0.6638).
This difference is glaringly obvious when we look at the smoothed proba-
bilities of the high-volatility state of the two models (Figure 1).11 In the case
of the reduced model, three distinct periods of high-volatility can be identi-
fied, namely 1990 until late 1992, mid 1993 until early 1995, and mid 1997
until late 1998. However, in the full model only the first and third periods
are identifiable. The effect of fiscal discipline is striking in that it seems to
reduce variability substantially in the intervening period. In effect, Macau’s
CBA has been in the low-volatility state since late 1992, with the brief ex-
ception of the relatively short period that began in October 1997. Note that
this was precisely the month in which there was a strong speculative attack
on the Hong Kong dollar following the contagion effect of the East Asian
financial turmoil.
In order to gain a better insight into the CBA’s dynamics, we plot sep-
arately in Figures 2 to 4 the EMP, interest rate and fiscal discipline time
series together with the smoothed probability of the high-volatility regime
(full model). We observe that the level and variability of EMP is much
greater during the high-volatility period that runs from 1990 until late 1992
11The smoothed probabilities are the probabilities that EMP is in regime i at time t
conditioned on the information of the whole sample.
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when compared to the remainder of the sample period (Figure 2). EMP’s
increased variability during this period mostly reflects global financial tur-
bulence due to events such as the closure of BCCI (HK) in the summer of
1991, the Gulf War (August 1990) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism’s crisis
period (September 1992). However, we observe that the East Asian finan-
cial crisis period is not similarly accompanied by significant EMP variability,
which is somewhat puzzling at first.
The most striking observation, however, relates to movements in Macau’s
interest rate during the East Asian crisis, which are relatively large (Figure
3). Given that EMP variability is not unusually high, as noted above, we
infer that interest rate changes are bearing the brunt of the required ad-
justment thereby explaining the apparent puzzle. In other words, it appears
that the interest rate arbitrage mechanism was allowed to operate unhindered
throughout this period. As a result, Macau’s interbank rates rose substan-
tially and lead to considerable risk premiums vis-à-vis US interest rates, as
is evident in Figure 5. Recall that one would expect to observe precisely
such an interest rate premium in the face of exchange rate risk or persistent
economic uncertainty in order to induce the desired counter-flow of capital.
Finally, note that the change in government’s fiscal stance has a low fre-
quency over time, including during the East Asian crisis period (Figure 4).
The low frequency undoubtedly reflects economic agent’s perceptions regard-
ing the credibility of Macau’s fiscal policy and would appear to rationalise
our finding that fiscal discipline contributes towards reduced EMP variability
during periods of low-volatility.
4 Conclusion
A pure CBA signals its credibility by allowing the interest and exchange
rate arbitrage mechanisms to function automatically and by pursuing sound
fiscal policies. In order to study the credibility of Macau’s CBA, we first
establish that Macau’s foreign reserve changes are a valid measure of EMP
using Girton-Roper’s (1977) monetary model. Next, we address the issue of
credibility directly by studying the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on
the stochastic properties of EMP using a MSGARCH model. Specifically,
we assess how the dependent variable of EMP responds to lagged changes in
explanatory variables that capture the three anchors of a pure CBA.
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Our results suggest that the exchange rate arbitrage mechanism operates
effectively during periods of low-volatility but is clearly not as important as
the other two anchors. More significantly, we establish that interest rate
arbitrage affects the mean level of EMP in both regimes and contributes
towards variability reduction in the high-volatility state. Fiscal discipline, on
the other hand, is associated with variability reduction in the low-volatility
state and is also more important than interest rate arbitrage in accounting
for changes in mean EMP in this state. Fiscal fundamentals thus seem to
have a more pronounced role in variability reduction in the low-volatility
state whilst changes in Macau’s interest rates, are more important in periods
of high volatility. In other words, in “normal” times, Macau’s sound fiscal
stance is sufficient to ensure zero or low EMP, leaving interest rate arbitrage
as the sole adjustment mechanism in periods of abnormal EMP.
Based on the above findings, we conclude that Macau’s CBA is credible
and has delivered financial stability. Indeed, the prevailing exchange rate
arrangement has served as a major incentive for authorities to follow sound
monetary and fiscal policies. In practice, the CBA’s credibility is reflected
in the low frequency of observed EMP, in the narrowing of Macau’s interest
rate differential vis-à-vis U.S. interest rates and in Macau’s substantial fiscal
reserves. Not surprisingly, Macau’s sound economic performance has been
increasingly acknowledged in international financial markets.
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Table 1: MSGARCH Estimation Results – Full Model 
     
Parameter Estimate Std Error Est./Std. Error p-value 
Mean Equation 
10α  0.5699 0.2872 1.984 0.0236** 
20α  - - - - 
11α  0.1491 0.0677 2.203 0.0138** 
21α  0.4994 0.2144 2.329 0.0099** 
D1α  -0.7097 0.4298 -1.651 0.0493** 
D2α  - - - - 
I1α  0.6638 0.211 3.146 0.0008** 
I2α  1.1226 0.6599 1.701 0.0445** 
B1α  2.0769 0.7058 2.943 0.0016** 
B2α  - - - - 
Conditional Variance Equation 
10β  2.1254 1.289 1.649 0.0496** 
20β  3.1062 2.1475 1.446 0.074* 
I1β  - - - - 
I2β  -0.438 0.2248 -1.948 0.0257** 
B1β  -2.6763 1.0652 -2.512 0.006** 
B2β  - - - - 
TVTP Equation 
10γ  3.0204 0.9996 3.022 0.0013** 
20γ  0.9807 0.3927 2.498 0.0063** 
d  2.7201 1.384 1.965 0.0247** 
Log-Likelihood -402.82    
AIC -417.82    
SBC -440.89    
No. Obs. 160    
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Table 1 (continued): MSGARCH Estimation Results – Full Model 
 
  Ljung-Box  Ljung-Box  ARCH-LM  
   Standardised Residuals Squared Residuals Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag1 0.0136 0.9071 0.0645 0.7995 0.0629 0.8019 
Lag2 1.0113 0.6031 0.1796 0.9141 0.1755 0.9160 
Lag3 2.9064 0.4063 0.2473 0.9696 0.2445 0.9701 
Lag4 2.9117 0.5727 0.2490 0.9929 0.2469 0.9930 
Lag5 2.9118 0.7136 0.3811 0.9958 0.3796 0.9959 
Lag6 4.1002 0.6631 0.4501 0.9984 0.4475 0.9984 
Lag7 4.5825 0.7108 0.4670 0.9996 0.4695 0.9996 
Lag8 5.1445 0.742 0.4874 0.9999 0.4962 0.9999 
Lag9 5.6905 0.7704 0.5275 1.0000 0.5407 1.0000 
Lag10 15.0001 0.1321 2.8595 0.9845 2.4718 0.9913 
Lag11 15.1082 0.1776 2.9106 0.9919 2.5078 0.9958 
Lag12 15.6868 0.206 2.9153 0.9961 2.4885 0.9982 
Lag13 15.6898 0.2663 2.9282 0.9982 2.4759 0.9993 
Lag14 15.9821 0.3145 3.0652 0.9990 2.5926 0.9996 
Lag15 16.6134 0.3425 3.1500 0.9995 2.6378 0.9998 
Lag16 17.4534 0.3569 3.2406 0.9997 2.6869 0.9999 
Lag17 19.2465 0.3146 3.3026 0.9999 2.7140 1.0000 
Lag18 20.6678 0.2965 3.3481 0.9999 2.7372 1.0000 
Lag19 20.6679 0.3554 3.4019 1.0000 2.7580 1.0000 
Lag20 20.9817 0.3982 3.4098 1.0000 2.8221 1.0000 
Notes: The parameter designations are as presented in the text. A double (single) asterisk denotes that the 
estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 2: MSGARCH Estimation Results – Reduced Model 
      
Parameter Estimate Std Error Est./Std. Error p-value 
Mean Equation 
10α  0.5901 0.1551 3.8040 0.0001** 
20α  - - - - 
11α  0.2007 0.0400 5.0220 0.0000** 
21α  0.4934 0.1406 3.5100 0.0002** 
D1α  -0.7202 0.2478 -2.906 0.0018** 
D2α  - - - - 
I1α  0.6926 0.2394 2.8930 0.0019** 
I2α  1.1512 0.3480 3.3080 0.0005** 
Conditional Variance Equation 
10β  1.6621 1.0408 1.5970 0.0551* 
20β  1.7900 1.2801 1.3980 0.0810* 
||1eβ  -1.5750 1.0533 -1.4950 0.0674* 
||2 eβ  1.0532 0.6253 1.6840 0.0461** 
v1β  0.1969 0.1769 1.1130 0.1328 
v2β  0.4927 0.2572 1.9160 0.0277** 
I1β  -1.0812 0.4601 -2.3500 0.0094** 
I2β  -0.3170 0.1223 -2.5930 0.0048** 
TVTP Equation 
10γ  2.8533 0.3844 7.4230 0.0000** 
20γ  1.5148 0.3137 4.8280 0.0000** 
d  2.6351 0.4520 5.8300 0.0000** 
Log-Likelihood -409.393    
AIC -426.393    
SBC -452.532    
No. Obs. 160    
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Table 2 (continued): MSGARCH Estimation Results – Reduced Model 
 
  Ljung-Box   Ljung-Box  ARCH-LM  
   Standardised Residuals Squared Residuals Statistic 
Lag Q p-value Q2 p-value LM p-value 
Lag1 0.2191 0.6397 0.1791 0.6722 0.1764 0.6745 
Lag2 0.3055 0.8583 0.2962 0.8624 0.2861 0.8667 
Lag3 1.7360 0.6290 0.3504 0.9503 0.3401 0.9523 
Lag4 1.9278 0.7490 0.3653 0.9852 0.3638 0.9853 
Lag5 2.0818 0.8377 0.5333 0.9909 0.5402 0.9906 
Lag6 2.5369 0.8643 0.6509 0.9955 0.6591 0.9953 
Lag7 3.2735 0.8586 0.6620 0.9986 0.6746 0.9985 
Lag8 3.6031 0.8910 0.6630 0.9996 0.6766 0.9996 
Lag9 3.6364 0.9337 0.7693 0.9998 0.7903 0.9998 
Lag10 7.6321 0.6647 1.8453 0.9974 1.6386 0.9984 
Lag11 8.3408 0.6825 1.9579 0.9986 1.7780 0.9991 
Lag12 8.4601 0.7482 1.9693 0.9995 1.7705 0.9997 
Lag13 8.7973 0.7881 2.0991 0.9997 1.8750 0.9998 
Lag14 9.5981 0.7909 2.2254 0.9998 1.9702 0.9999 
Lag15 9.9065 0.8256 2.3313 0.9999 2.0258 1.0000 
Lag16 10.7113 0.8269 2.3622 1.0000 2.0304 1.0000 
Lag17 13.6416 0.6923 2.4389 1.0000 2.0693 1.0000 
Lag18 16.6121 0.5499 2.4451 1.0000 2.0817 1.0000 
Lag19 17.0464 0.5867 2.4467 1.0000 2.0519 1.0000 
Lag20 18.1181 0.5796 2.5385 1.0000 2.0668 1.0000 
Notes: The parameter designations are as presented in the text. A double (single) asterisk denotes that the 
estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% (10%) level.  
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Figure 1: (Smoothed) Probability of High Volatility State 
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Figure 2: Reserve Changes & Probability of High Volatility State 
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Figure 3: Interest Rate Change & Probability of High Volatility State 
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Figure 4:  Budget Balance & Probability of High Volatility State 
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Figure 5A: Macau, Hong-Kong & US Interest Rates (monthly) 
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Figure 5B: Macau’s Interest Rate Differential (monthly)  
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Appendix 1: The Girton-Roper Model
Girton and Roper (hereafter, G-R)(1977) define EMP as the magnitude
of money market disequilibrium that must be removed either through reserve
or exchange rate changes.12 As such, the sum of the rate of change in inter-
national reserves, deflated by the level of the monetary base, and the rate
of change in the exchange rate itself, is taken to be a proxy measure of the
actual amount of EMP. The main elements of G-R model are the demand
for and the supply of money. The former is taken to be stable function of
real income (Yt) and the domestic price level (Pt), given by
Mdt = kPtYt (A1.1)
where k denotes a constant. The supply of money is specified as the product
of the money multiplier (mt) and the monetary base (Bt = Rt+DCt),where
Rt andDCt respectively denote net foreign asset holdings and domestic credit
creation:
Mst = mtBt (A1.2)
The model assumes money-market equilibrium and also that the purchasing
power parity relationship holds continuously, i.e.
Mdt = M
s
t (A1.3)
Pt =
P ∗t
Et
(A1.4)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate, measured in units of foreign currency,
and P ∗t is the foreign price level. Substituting (A1.1) and (A1.2) into (1) and
then taking the natural log yields
ln k + lnPt + lnYt = lnmt + lnBt (A1.5)
12An attractive feature of G-R’s model is its broad applicability to intermediate exchange
rate arrangements in which EMP is removed either through a combination of changes in
the exchange rate or in foreign exchange rate reserves, or both. As examples, consider
Connolly and Silveira (1979), Modeste (1981), Kim (1985), Wohar and Lee (1992), and
Thorton (1995), who have applied the G-R model in the context of Brazil, Argentina,
Korea, Japan and Costa Rica respectively.
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which can also be expressed as
ln k − lnEt + lnP ∗t + lnYt = lnmt + ln(Rt +DCt) (A1.6)
after substituting the log version of equation (A1.4) into equation (A1.5) to-
gether with the definition of monetary base. Differentiating equation (A1.6)
with respect to time yields13
rt + et = p
∗
t + yt −mt − dt (A1.7)
where the lower case denotes changes in the log of the variables with the ex-
ception of Rt and DCt, respectively defined as rt =
dRt/dt
Rt+DCt
and dt =
dDCt/dt
Rt+DCt
,
i.e. the ratios of changes in reserves and of domestic credit changes with
respect to the monetary base. The remaining variables are the growth rates
of foreign prices (p∗t ), of domestic income (yt) and of the money multiplier
(mt). Under the model’s assumptions, the parameters are restricted to take
on the following values: δ1 = δ2 = 1 while δ3 = δ4 = −1.
Note that in the case of fixed exchange regimes, exchange rate changes are
zero by definition (et = 0), implying that rt is the sole dependent variable.
This simplified variant of equation (A1.7) is estimated using the two-stage
least squares (2SLS) method. The 2SLS methodology is chosen since it is
highly likely that the dependent variable is correlated with the error term,
thus rendering ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates biased and
inconsistent. Such a situation arises either because endogenously determined
variables appear on the right-hand side of equation (A1.7) or because these
are measured with error, or both. Lags of the model’s variables are used
as instruments in the 2SLS estimation process and all the regressors are
stationary, as expected. Given the presence of serial correlation in the data,
we also allow for the possibility that the errors follow an autoregressive (AR)
13The derivative of equation (6) w.r.t. time is
d lnP ∗t
dt
−d lnEt
dt
+
d lnYt
dt
=
d lnmt
dt
+
1
Rt +DCt
dRt
dt
+
1
Rt +DCt
dDCt
dt
which can be rearranged as
1
Rt +DCt
dRt
dt
+
d lnEt
dt
=
d lnP ∗t
dt
+
d lnYt
dt
−d lnmt
dt
− 1
Rt +DCt
dDCt
dt
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or a moving average (MA) process of order n, where n takes on the values
1 to 4. In practice, the residuals are not serially correlated once the EMP
equation had been amended to allow for an MA(2) process.
The G-R model applied to Macau uses monthly data for the sample pe-
riod January 1990 until July 2003. In the model, the variables Rt and DCt
respectively denote Macau’s net foreign asset holdings and domestic credit
creation. The US consumer price index is used as a proxy of the foreign price
level P ∗t and the M1 money multiplier is chosen as it a better representative
of the transactions behaviour of money. The choice of an appropriate mea-
sure of domestic income is rather more difficult since the usual measures of
GDP or industrial production data are unavailable on a monthly basis for
Macau.14
The parameter estimates of the model is presented in Table A1. We find
that the estimates provide very strong evidence in support of the model as
all estimated coefficients are correctly signed and significantly different from
zero at the 5% significance level. In addition, the coefficient of the income
level and of the money multiplier are close their hypothesised values (δ2 = 1
and δ3 = −1, respectively), as confirmed by the Wald tests. The diagnostic
tests of the residuals indicate the absence of significant serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and non-normal behaviour. Overall, the model appears
to fit the data quite well, as revealed by the plot of the actual versus the
predicted data series Figure A1.
Finally, note also that reserve changes are measured as ∆st = 100 ·
ln[Rt/Rt−1] in the case of the MSGARCH model, which is estimated in sec-
14On this score, we faced two practical options: the use of interpolation methods, which
would convert annual GDP data into monthly GDP data, or the use of a suitable proxy. In
unreported work, we evaluated monthly government expenditures as a potential proxy. We
found that this proxy’s behaviour over time compared well to that of actual GDP (annual)
data once the monthly series had been converted into an annual one. Moreover, the use of
the proxy in the G-R model yielded good results. In comparison, the interpolated GDP
data performed poorly. The reason for this poor performance is possibly due to the fact
that it is in general impossible to perfectly recover the high frequency series from the low
frequency data. Since observing a series at a lower frequency provides fundamentally less
information than observing the same series at a higher frequency, the results from the use
of interpolation methods must be considered as suggestive rather than as providing the
true values of the underlying series.
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tion 3.15 It can be easily shown that ∆st is also a suitable measure of EMP.
To see this, first recall that equation (A1.7) can also be expressed as
1
Rt +DCt
dRt
dt
=
d lnP ∗t
dt
+
d lnYt
dt
−d lnmt
dt
− 1
Rt +DCt
dDCt
dt
(A1.7’)
Note that d lnRt
dRt
= 1
Rt
, or equivalently dRt = Rtd lnRt. Differentiating the
latter expression with respect to time yields
dRt
dt
= Rt
d lnRt
dt
+ d lnRt
dRt
dt
= (Rt + dRt)
d lnRt
dt
which can be substituted into equation (A1.7’) to obtain
d lnRt
dt
=
Rt +DCt
Rt + dRt
·
d lnP ∗t
dt
+
d lnYt
dt
−d lnmt
dt
− 1
Rt +DCt
dDCt
dt
¸
or equivalently,
rt = θ [p∗t + yt −mt − dt] (A1.8)
where rt now denotes the change in the log of Rt and θ = Rt+DCtRt+dRt . Note
that in discrete time (dt = 1) we have rt = d lnRt = ln[Rt/Rt−1], which
is exactly the same change in reserves as ∆st (expressed on a scale of zero
to one instead of as a percentage). The parameter estimates of the model
given by equation (A1.8) are presented in Table A1. As before, we find
that estimates provide very strong evidence in support of the model as all
estimated coefficients are correctly signed and significantly different from
zero. The coefficient of the income level and of the money multiplier are
again close their hypothesised values and the diagnostic tests indicate the
absence of significant serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and non-normal
behaviour in the residuals.
15Without the loss of generality, we ignore the effect of scale in the exposition that
follows and take the dependent variable to be given by ∆st = ln[Rt/Rt−1] = d lnRt.
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Table A1: GIRTON-ROPER Estimation Results 
     
Parameter/ 
Test 
Estimate/ 
Statistic Std. Error 
Est./Std. 
Error p-value 
Panel A:  r = dRt/Baset 
1δ  0.6145 0.1043 5.8889 0.0000** 
2δ  0.7375 0.4409 1.6726 0.0964* 
3δ  -1.3549 0.6990 -1.9385 0.0544** 
4δ  -0.2969 0.1757 -1.6900 0.0931* 
Jarque-Bera 6.1670 - - 0.0458** 
LM(3) 0.2821 - - 0.9634 
ARCH(3) 5.3220 - - 0.1497 
Wald (H0: 11 =δ ) 13.6496 - - 0.0003** 
Wald (H0: 12 =δ ) 0.3546 - - 0.5524 
Wald (H0: 13 −=δ ) 0.2578 - - 0.6124 
Wald (H0: 14 −=δ ) 16.0193 - - 0.0001** 
R-squared -0.1132 - - - 
Std Error Regression 0.1982 - - - 
Sum Squared Errors 6.0104 - - - 
Durbin-Watson 1.9941 - - - 
Panel B:  r = ln(Rt/ Rt-1) 
1δ  0.7287 0.1550 4.7002 0.0000** 
2δ  0.8253 0.4904 1.6827 0.0945* 
3δ  -1.3241 0.6897 -1.9196 0.0538** 
4δ  -0.4918 0.2352 -2.0905 0.0382** 
Jarque-Bera 0.6448 - - 0.7243 
LM(3) 4.6262 - - 0.2013 
ARCH(3) 1.6801 - - 0.1736 
Wald (H0: 11 =δ ) 3.0607 - - 0.0822* 
Wald (H0: 12 =δ ) 0.1268 - - 0.7221 
Wald (H0: 13 −=δ ) 0.2208 - - 0.6390 
Wald (H0: 14 −=δ ) 4.6646 - - 0.0323** 
R-squared -0.0970 - - - 
Std Error Regression 0.0408 - - - 
Sum Squared Errors 0.2537 - - - 
Durbin-Watson 1.9877 - - - 
 
Notes: The parameter designations are as presented in the text. LM(t) and ARCH(t) respectively denote 
the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM and the ARCH-LM heteroscedasticity test statistics up to lag 
t while Wald is the F-statistic of Wald parameter test under the null hypothesis (H0). The R-squared 
statistic is calculated as 1-(SSE/((N-1)SDV2 +N*MDV2)) where MDV and SDV are respectively the 
mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable. N=160 is the number of observations. A double 
(single) asterisk indicates that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% (10%) 
level. 
30
Figure A1: Girton-Roper Model of EMP (monthly)  
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Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Reserve Changes
In accordance with the model being estimated, we measure changes in
reserves either as the ratio of reserve changes with respect to the monetary
base (Bt), denoted by rt =
dRt/dt
Bt
or as ∆st = 100 · ln[Rt/Rt−1]. The descrip-
tive statistics of these measures are given in Table A.2. The test statistics
reveal that the distribution of reserve changes is skewed for both measures
but with different signs. In the case of rt, skewness is negative but close to
zero while it is positive for ∆st, indicating the presence of a long right tail.16
In both cases, the distribution is leptokurtic, i.e. it is more peaked and
also has fatter tails when compared to the normal distribution, as revealed
by the kurtosis test statistic. The formal test of normality, given by the
Jarque-Bera statistic, clearly rejects the null hypothesis of reserve changes
being normally distributed. The Ljung-Box Q-statistics detect the presence
of significant serial autocorrelation and the ARCH-LM statistics suggest that
the ARCH effects are significant. However, we note that the effects of the
departure from normality, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are more
pronounced in the case of ∆st . These stylised features are taken into account
by our MSGARCH modelling framework when we study the stochastic prop-
erties of the changes in foreign reserves.
16Skewness is a measure of asymmetry around the mean of a series’ distribution. The
skewness of a symmetric distribution is zero (e.g. the normal distribution). Positive
skewness means that a distribution has a long right tail while negative skewness implies
that it has a long left tail. Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of a series’
distribution. The kurtosis of the normal distribution is three. A distribution is more
peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal if the kurtosis is greater than three and it is
flatter (platykurtic) if it is less than three.
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Reserve Changes  
 
 
Notes: The variable designations are as presented in the text. ρ(1) is the value of the autocorrelation 
function and Q(1) is the Ljung-Box Q-statistic at lag 1. LM(1) denotes the ARCH-LM statistic for the 
squared standardised residuals at lag 1. The fourth column gives the null hypotheses of the tests that were 
conducted. For example, the Jarque-Bera statistic tests for Normality while the ADF/Phillips-Perron 
procedures test for the presence of unit roots (no intercept or trend term). The last column contains the 
corresponding p-values, except for the case of the unit root tests where the number presented denotes the 
test’s 5% critical value. 
Variable Statistic Value Null Hypothesis p-value 
tr  Minimum -0.404 - - 
 Maximum 0.602 - - 
 Median 0.090 - - 
 Mean 0.075 Mean=0 0.000 
 Std Deviation 0.152 - - 
     
 Skewness -0.034 - - 
 Kurtosis 4.040 - - 
 Jarque-Bera 7.198 Normality 0.027 
     
 ρ(1) 0.308 - - 
 Q(1) 15.337  No Autocorrelation 0.000 
 LM(1) 3.702 No ARCH 0.045 
     
 ADF -3.834 Unit Root -1.942* 
 Phillips-Perron -8.152 Unit Root -1.942* 
ts∆  Minimum -8.448 - - 
 Maximum 16.407 - - 
 Median 1.446 - - 
 Mean 1.519 Mean=0 0.000 
 Std Deviation 3.509 - - 
     
 Skewness 0.609 - - 
 Kurtosis 6.221 - - 
 Jarque-Bera 78.592 Normality 0.000 
     
 ρ(1) 0.482 - - 
 Q(1) 37.672  No Autocorrelation 0.000 
 LM(1) 22.163 No ARCH 0.000 
     
 ADF -19.490 Unit Root -1.942* 
 Phillips-Perron -19.731 Unit Root -1.942* 
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